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Managing the Integration of Space 
and Information Operations
Space Command and Control
Maj Daniel F. Gottrich, USAF
Michael R. Grimaila, PhD, AFIT
We should not go to space unless it s̓ the only way we can do a 
job, or can do it better, or it s̓ cheaper.  The global movement of 
information seems to be the one thing we can use space for that 
we have not learned how to do on earth.1  
 - Lt Gen Richard Henry, 1982
Because over twenty years has passed since the establish-ment of Space Command in 1982, most members of the 
military are now comfortable with the axiom that space is the 
fourth realm of warfare in addition to the traditional spheres of 
land, air, and sea.  However, this transition was slow in coming. 
Even though the Cold War had seen operations brewing in space 
since the late 1950s, it took the establishment of a separate uni-
fied military command, the United States Space Command, or 
USSPACECOM (and, in 2001, a scathing Congressional report 
threatening to establish a separate space service), as well as years 
of joint space operations and wrangling over the creation of space 
doctrine, before space was accepted as a separate and distinct 
sphere of combat.  
It is ironic, then, that a fifth dimension of conflict, the realm of 
information operations (IO), has been less universally accepted 
as a theater of offensive and defensive warfare, despite the fact 
that armed forces have sought, defended, attacked, and exploited 
information in battle for centuries.  Information warfare is un-
fortunately tied to modern technology and computers, forgetting 
that the concept can be as simple as a wooden horse left as a gift 
outside a great fortified city.
However, military tacticians now understand and appreciate 
that the concept of information operations has been gradually get-
ting more attention focused on it in doctrine and contemporary 
military operations.  Inevitably in the 21st century the technologi-
cal aspect of conducting information operations is going to be 
linked to two things: space and cyberspace.  In this article, we will 
concentrate on the former, with the understanding that computers 
and the associated links, networks and nodes play a vital role in 
the command and control of operations in space.  We will discuss 
the historical ties between space and information operations, the 
difficulty that we in the space community have had in grasping 
information operations as a viable separate construct, and we will 
review some of the Air Force s̓ education efforts being applied 
to change that paradigm.  Finally, we will propose solutions to 
ensure information operations continue to be an effective weapon 
in our military s̓ arsenal.
History
Weʼve spent thirty-five or forty billion dollars on the space program. 
And if nothing else had come out of it except the knowledge weʼve 
gained from space photography it would be worth ten times what 
the whole program cost.  Because tonight we know how many mis-
siles the enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses were way off.  We 
were doing things we didnʼt need to do.  We were building things 
we didnʼt need to build.  We were harboring fears we didnʼt need to 
harbor.2                   - President Lyndon Johnson, 1967
Similar to the first military uses of airplanes and balloons, the 
initial utility of satellites came from its surveillance capabilities. 
Space was the ultimate “high ground”—as every general from 
Patton to Napoleon to Caesar would tell you, knowing what is 
happening on the other side of that hill is paramount for situa-
tion awareness.  The National Reconnaissance Office s̓ recently 
declassified CORONA program was established in 1960 as the 
nation s̓ first operational satellite photo reconnaissance project. 
Imagery intelligence is still a vital asset provided by optical satel-
lite sensors today, though it is telling to see how far the technol-
ogy has advanced in forty years.
Ever since the 1957 launch of Sputnik, when the United States 
realized that the Soviet Union could now launch a rocket capable 
of landing an object (a nuclear warhead?) anywhere on the globe, 
our military posture became based on information gathering and 
deterrence based on flexible response.  As Lt Col James Lee 
wrote in Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance, 
“US military space systems were initially developed in a Cold 
War context and viewed as primarily strategic systems—support-
ing the Strategic Air Command, the intelligence community, and 
the National Command Authorities.  Timely, accurate, and unam-
biguous strategic and tactical warning information from recon-
naissance, surveillance, and communication satellites provided 
situation awareness of our perceived enemy and became integral 
to the deterrent power of the triad.”3
In essence, Lee asserts that our military systems became almost 
a hidden fourth leg of the strategic nuclear triad.  The strength 
of Soviet and American nuclear deterrence relied on the ability 
of satellites and their ground networks to collect, process, and 
disseminate information.  The balance of information provided 
by these systems resulted in each of the belligerents having a 
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Figure 1. (left)  First imagery taken by CORONA, Mys Shmidta Air 
Field, USSR, 1960.  Figure 2. (right)  Nellis AFB, Nevada, 2002.
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sufficient amount of timely warning of the other side s̓ capabilities 
and actions.  Lee continues, “Maintaining the balance in warning 
information prevented one side from achieving surprise and 
rendering the other side incapable of a nuclear retaliatory strike. 
In fact, the value of the information from space systems was 
viewed as essential for cold war stability, and many argued that 
space must remain a sanctuary to preserve stability.”4
Ultimately, space s̓ role in “standing toe to toe with the Ruskies” 
has been played out, with, some argue, President Reagan s̓ threats 
to provide an anti-nuclear blanket of protection with his Strate-
gic Defense Initiative bankrupting the Soviet coffers when they 
attempted to counter it.  Space has more recently moved from 
this strategic role to the tactical missions of day-to-day combat 
support.
Operation DESERT STORM is mistakenly referred to as the 
“first space war,” though no battles were fought from or through 
space.  But the Gulf War saw the first combat use of Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) satellites, used both by supporting General 
Norman Schwarzkopf s̓ “left hook” through the featureless des-
ert and through Joint Direct Attack Munitions, or “smart bombs.” 
This war also highlighted the multiple uses of satellites in provid-
ing imagery, weather data, theater ballistic missile launch warn-
ing, and, especially, communications in remote areas with not a 
lot of land lines.  More than 90 percent of communications in-
theater was provided via the Defense Satellite Communications 
System, an array of satellites orbiting 28,000 miles overhead. 
The conflict also pointed out our asymmetric advantage in the 
space arena, however, and some of the benefits we enjoyed then, 
we could not realize today.  For example, because of the mul-
titude of commercial imaging satellites on the market, there is 
no way General Schwarzkopf s̓ maneuver to the west and north 
around Kuwait would go undetected today.  Our use of GPS 
technology compelled Saddam Hussein to purchase several GPS 
jamming devices prior to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (though, 
fortunately, he and his military did not know how to employ 
them very effectively).  Also, because of our reliance on satellites 
for communication, bandwidth was used to full capacity, some-
times forcing large files like imagery or Air Tasking Orders to be 
shipped by airplane rather than satellite links.  Further, Operation 
DESERT STORM forced us to understand that our enemies do 
not rely on technology like we do, and we were still ineffective 
in shutting down all aspects of the Iraqi s̓ ability to wage war. 
Several analysts suspect that after our forces destroyed Saddam 
Hussein s̓ more advanced telecommunications systems (satellite, 
microwave, and cable systems), he continued to relay launch or-
ders to Scud missile batteries via courier.5
As the last century closed, the cost of launching satellites start-
ed to decrease and the number of civil and foreign entities getting 
into the space business exploded.  We had entered what many la-
beled “the Information Age.”  But in this case, the availability of 
information is a double-edged sword that is effectively whittling 
away at the advantage enjoyed by the United States as one of the 
historical few that has in the past controlled space system infor-
mation.6  The commercial application and exploitation of space 
information is another threat that must be a part of any military 
space professional education.  
Organization and Education
We need space professionals in all services and agencies…to exploit 
space effectively in the interests of national security.  Development 
of a space cadre is one of our top agenda items for national security 
space programs in 2004.
- Under Secretary of the Air Force Peter Teets
Report to Congress, 12 March 2003
In 2001, Maj Daniel F. Gottrich was assigned to the USAF 
Space Operations School (SOPSC), a division in the Space War-
fare Center on Schriever AFB, Colorado.  Its mission was two-
fold: to develop space tactics, techniques, and procedures for 
warfighting doctrine and to educate space personnel (and mem-
bers from other specialties who had signed up) about operational 
space systems.  A career space officer who had just returned from 
an overseas tour in Turkey, he was tasked to develop a lesson for 
space doctrine, which he knew very little about, satellite com-
munications, which he would have to brush up on, and something 
called IO.  Major Gottrich had never heard of the term, so he was 
surprised to be assigned responsibility to teach a course on the 
topic to a room full of joint professionals.
To prepare, Major Gottrich attended an IO conference in Feb-
ruary of 2002 in Las Cruces, New Mexico called “Phoenix Chal-
lenge” which brought together military, industry, and academic 
leaders to highlight the latest in IO technology, best practices, and 
literature.  The over-arching message was how prevalent IO was 
in our society, and Major Gottrich was shocked that he had never 
heard of it during his military training.  Too often we as a military 
equate IO with computers and consider it the bailiwick of com-
munications experts.  Indeed, Major Gottrich would often ask his 
class members why they thought he was teaching IO in a space 
operations class, and would inevitably receive the response: “be-
cause our satellites are controlled by computers.”  
The past few years have seen new strides in education, sparked 
by the creation of the Air Force Doctrine Center at Maxwell AFB, 
Alabama in 1997 (compare this date with Army s̓ Training and 
Doctrine Command established in 1968).  New space and IO doc-
trine has been created and updated several times in those eight 
years, and the lessons are trickling down to the units.  “Air, space 
and information functions work best in an integrated and syn-
ergistic way,” states a recent Doctrine Watch lecture emailed to 
every Operations Support Squadron for further dissemination. 
“Integrating effects-based information operations functions with 
the other air and space power functions is a crucial part of the Air 
Force s̓ operational art.”7
Doctrine became a very important part of SOPSC lectures, 
particularly tying space and information operations together. 
The course had already covered space doctrine, and the four core 
space mission areas:
• Space Control – ensures freedom of action in space for the 
US and its allies and may deny an adversary freedom of 
action 
• Space Force Support – consists of operations that deploy, 
augment, sustain, and replenish space forces, including the 
configuration of command and control structures for space 
operations and all launch operations
• Space Force Application – would consist of attacks against 
terrestrial-based targets carried out by military weapons 
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operating in or through space 
• Space Force Enhancement – provides navigation, com-
munications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance 
(ISR), ballistic missile warning, and environmental sensing 
(weather) 
The SOPSC lesson would demonstrate that the Space Force 
Enhancement mission had the greatest impact on IO by provid-
ing the Information-In-Warfare (IIW) capabilities that enable the 
commanders to have a full picture of the battlespace in order to 
make the best decisions.  It would also stress how space systems 
would enable these elements, specifically the IIW capabilities, 
through satellite support.  ISR functions are supported by satellite 
imaging capabilities, weather services rely on the Defense Me-
teorological Support Program satellites and the precision, naviga-
tion and positioning is provided by GPS.8
Furthermore, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2: 
Space Operations, states: Space, air, and information platforms 
are mutually supporting and supported throughout the spectrum 
of conflict:
• Space assets are unable to contribute if their uplinks and 
downlinks are interrupted or their ground control and re-
ceiving stations are disabled
• Information superiority helps ensure the freedom from at-
tack for control and mission links that tie space providers to 
ground, air, or sea-based users
• Space, air, and information superiority are mutually sup-
porting objectives.  It is extremely difficult to maintain one 
without the others and the value of one is greatly enhanced 
when accompanied by the others9
Space and IO capabilities are intertwined and almost have a 
symbiotic relationship.  Information is the lifeblood of IO and 
space plays a major role in providing the platforms for this info 
to flow.  But space operations also enable some offensive and 
defensive IO tactics as well.  Space assets can be used for public 
affairs, psychological operations, and operational security (OP-
SEC).  Maj Robert Newberry wrote in Space Doctrine for the 
Twenty-first Century that OPSEC has been a prominent feature 
of our space forces, and the trick is to balance usability with clas-
sification issues.  He writes, “A comprehensive OPSEC plan can 
help prevent attacks on US space forces by making it more dif-
ficult for an adversary to launch an attack.”  Newberry also as-
serts, “OPSEC can create uncertainty as to the true nature of US 
space operations and deny the adversary needed targeting data. 
Although the benefit to some space systems may be negligible, 
OPSEC can be particularly effective in protecting high-value as-
sets.”10  Major Newberry offers the following table comparing 
different levels of OPSEC available within space operations and 
their effects on the enemy s̓ ability to wage war.
We can also use space assets to defend our actions or counter 
enemy propaganda.  For instance, in 1998, Saddam Hussein de-
cided to allow the United Nations weapons inspectors back into 
his country, but informed them that they would not be able to 
inspect “palace grounds.”  We were able to use satellites as part of 
a counter-information campaign to show the world how coopera-
tive the Iraqi leader was really being.
 However, satellite technology is not perfect.  During Opera-
tion ALLIED FORCE, the Serbs were still able to fool some of 
our most skilled observers with rubber or wooden mock-ups of 
cannons or aircraft.  In one instance, they even hung lanterns in 
the “exhaust” to make it appear on infra-red sensors to have a heat 
signature.  
About the same time as Major Gottrich s̓ arrival to the SOP-
SC, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) was also reeling from a 
scathing Congressional report released in January of 2001.  The 
Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Se-
curity Space Management and Organization,11 also known as the 
“Rumsfeld Report” since Donald Rumsfeld was the Chairman of 
the Commission (before recusing himself to become Secretary 
of Defense) had given the services a failing grade in developing 
space professionals, in particular decrying the Air Force practice 
of bringing in pilots to command space units for short periods in 
a vain attempt to show breadth in leadership.   Assignments were 
poorly managed, and continuing education after entry level (as a 
young airman or second lieutenant) was non-existent.  The report 
recommended that the Air Force be given one last shot to trans-
form itself before being forced to carve off its space operations 
into a separate service or a subordinate but separate entity like the 
Navy/Marine Corps relationship.
Early in 2003, the SOPSC took the lead for developing and 
executing the first four-week “Space 200” course, geared towards 
mid-career officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians at the 
8- to 10-year point.  The course, using material taken from some 
existing SOPSC courses and augmented with additional material 
in the fields of acquisition, engineering, and nuclear operations, 
had a stronger emphasis on warfighter integration of space power 
in the joint fight.  The course also consisted of increased technical 
Figure 3.  Radwaniyah Presidential Site.
The approximate total area 
of the White House and its 
grounds.
Approximate boundary of Iraqi 
declared Presidential Site
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Operational Art Element Adversary’s Uncertainty
1. Encryption I donʼt know what they are doing.
2. Observation Management Can I believe what I see?
3. Training They seem to anticipate my moves.
4. Interoperability What are the connections?
5. Data Fusion Can I have a meaningful effect?
6. Launch on Demand Should I expect more?
Table 1.  Operational Art Element vs. Adversary s̓ Uncertainty.
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content, to include a design exercise in which student groups 
designed a satellite program to fulfill a Department of Defense 
(DoD) requirement, then considered its application in a capstone 
wargame exercise at the end of the course.  
SOPSC also initiated the development of Advanced Space 
Training (AST) courses in order to produce system experts that 
will return to unit or wing tactics shops to be instructors.  Cur-
rently, space officers are sent to the Weapons School at Nellis 
AFB, Nevada where they become generalists in all space systems 
and learn integration of air, space, and information operations. 
These graduates are sent to Major Commands (MAJCOMs), Uni-
fied Commands, and theater Air and Space Operations Centers 
(AOCs).  The vision for AST is to mirror the air side of Weapons 
School, wherein pilots are immersed in their particular weapons 
system and graduate as experts on that platform.  The SOPSC s̓ 
first AST course, Navigation Operations, took ten officers and 
NCOs through an intensive, 12-week curriculum where they be-
came experts in GPS, navigation tactics, the command and con-
trol structure, concepts of operation, acquisition, and weapon sys-
tem applications.  
In the spring of 2005, the Air Warfare Center and Space War-
fare Center were administratively merged into the US Air Force 
Warfare Center in order to “better manage air, space, and infor-
mation operations combat capabilities to support missions world-
wide.”12  There is talk of including the Information Warfare Cen-
ter (another potential assignment for space operations personnel), 
currently located at Lackland AFB, Texas, in future reorganiza-
tion plans.  In addition, more and more space professionals are 
deploying overseas, and many of them are being attached to In-
formation Warfare (IW) Flights within an AOC.  
Organizationally, space command has been tied to IO since 
the late 1990s.  In response to a number of attacks on govern-
ment computer networks, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
ordered the Defense Information Systems Agency to establish the 
Joint Task Force-Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND), which 
was transferred to Colorado Springs  ̓ then Space Command 
(USSPACECOM) in 1999.  As the senior computer emergency 
response team in the DoD, the JTF-CND was the responsible cell 
for all CND issues, including recommending changes to the infor-
mation condition status when the situation required.13  In 2001, it 
was renamed the Joint Task Force-Computer Network Operations 
to reflect its growth and mission, and continued to operate under 
the IO portion of the USSPACECOM mission until 2003, when 
US Northern Command was set up to coordinate military home-
land security efforts and USSPACECOM was absorbed into US 
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), with the IO tasking going 
to USSTRATCOM at Offutt AFB in Omaha, Nebraska.14
Securing Information In Space
The [DoD] must enhance the capability and survivability of its space 
systems.  Activities conducted in space are critical to national secu-
rity and the economic well-being of the nation.  Both friends and 
potential adversaries will become more dependent on space systems 
for communications, situational awareness, positioning, navigation, 
and timing.  In addition to exploiting space for their own purposes, 
future adversaries will likely also seek to deny US forces unimpeded 
access to and the ability to operate through and from space.  US 
forces must ensure space control and thereby guarantee US freedom 
of action in space in time of conflict.15            
- Director, Force Transformation Office, 2003
Our dependence on space makes satellites not only a valuable 
tool, but prime targets.  Ideally, all satellites should be hardened 
from attack; commercial investors, however, are reluctant to 
spend the money to protect their satellites.16  High-altitude nu-
clear bursts and the resultant electromagnetic pulse (EMP) might 
render most allied space assets inert.  EMP could burn out the 
circuitry of most allied radio systems, computers, transistors, and 
power grids in the region of combat, rendering many of the allies  ̓
high-tech assets harmless.17
On the flip side, because of cost and the physics involved, it 
is unlikely that many countries are attempting to develop anti-
satellite weapons.18  It is more likely that an adversary will try 
to exploit the information-gathering apparatus on the ground, ei-
ther by physical destruction, jamming, or other means of denial. 
Jamming is very similar to a computer hacker s̓ denial-of-service 
attack, essentially transmitting a high-power, bogus electronic 
signal that causes the bit error rate in the satellite s̓ uplink or 
downlink signals to increase, resulting in the satellite or ground 
station receiver losing lock.19  GPS receivers, for example, are no-
toriously vulnerable to jamming because of the low power in the 
navigation message.  Power of just a few watts can jam the access 
code at a distance of 10-20 kilometers.20  Indeed, the signal com-
ing off a GPS satellite, orbiting at 12,500 miles, is the equivalent 
of a 25 watt light bulb.
Attacking the link segment by spoofing involves taking over 
the space system by appearing as an authorized user, such as es-
tablishing a command link with an enemy satellite and sending 
anomalous commands to degrade its performance.  Spoofing is 
one of the most discrete and deniable non-lethal methods avail-
able for offensive counterspace operations.21  These ground at-
tacks will appear like a series of nuisance events, or computer 
vandalism.  But how do we distinguish a computer “glitch” from 
an information attack that has disrupted our satellite command 
and control network, such as the May 1998 failure of PanAmSat s̓ 
Galaxy 4 communications satellite?  The satellite s̓ computer 
crashed unexpectedly, and the spacecraft temporarily went out of 
control.  Somewhere between 80 and 90 percent of America s̓ 45 
million pagers went dead, and National Public Radio lost its feed 
to local stations.22
Offensively, information dominance can be attained “by col-
lapsing an adversary s̓ command and control infrastructure 
through offensive operations, such as the disruption of critical 
communication links; or by denying access to reconnaissance and 
surveillance information, such as blinding optical sensors with 
ground-based lasers.  Defensively, measures such as hardening, 
frequency hopping, and encryption further ensure information 
dominance by helping to ensure friendly forces have uninhibited 
access to communications, surveillance and reconnaissance in-
formation provided by space systems.”23  It is these offensive and 
defensive IO measures that the US needs to focus training and 
funding toward in the coming decades in order to thwart the up-
and-coming challenges of a technologically savvy adversary such 
as China.
The US military traditionally uses spacepower assets for two 
primary purposes: (1) to improve the situation awareness of its 
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forces; and (2) as a means of command, control, and communi-
cations.  Lieutenant Colonel Lee writes, “We essentially exploit 
space power assets as a permanent informational infrastructure 
that is globally available to friendly forces.  This allows friend-
ly forces to operate on interior lines of information around the 
globe.”24  But it also allows our enemies access to this same infor-
mation.  Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam recently expressed 
concern over Google Earth s̓ free satellite imagery software, 
which provides clear pictures of some of India s̓ military and 
government facilities, claiming the information could be used by 
terrorists to plan attacks.25
“No claim is made that US military forces are neutered with-
out space support.  Terrestrial forces can still fight without space 
support,” writes Maj M.V. Smith.  “However, the absence of 
space support will inarguably increase the fog, friction, and over-
all costs of military operations.”26
Recommendations for the Future
The Air Force must begin to think and bring forward the technolo-
gies necessary for space control.  Capabilities to defend our own 
space based resources and to disrupt, degrade, deny, or destroy that 
of the enemy will be needed sooner or later in the 21st century.  The 
technologies needed to protect our space resources from enemies 
include high thrust, high specific impulse electric propulsion, large 
constellations of low cost satellites with distributed functionality or 
networking across the system, and autonomous guidance and navi-
gation.27         - USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1995
Trying to predict our technological future is futile.  In 1982, 
the contemporary feeling from senior Defense Department lead-
ers was that space-based lasers, capable of global ballistic missile 
defense from ICBM launches from the Soviet Union, would be in 
orbit in “ten or eleven years.”28  It is fair to conclude that we are 
easily the world s̓ best military force, though our dominance may 
not last forever, given the declining costs and spread of technol-
ogy.29  But speculation on our specific offensive and defensive 
capabilities is something for the scientific journals, though the 
research labs, battle labs, and warfare centers are doing remark-
able research.
The United States has fielded laser illuminators that use semicon-
ductor laser arrays to aid night vision devices.  Projecting a laser 
beam over a large area on the earth s̓ surface would help low-light 
imaging systems to find targets.  A space-based battlefield illumina-
tor would generate beams from satellites in low-earth orbit and di-
rect them to the target.  This technology would allow military forces 
to acquire targets with low-light imaging systems, insert and remove 
special operations teams under low light conditions, and increase the 
security of high-value facilities at night.  Because the beam is eye-
safe, the illuminator could be used for psychological operations in 
which US observers search covertly for enemy units.30
Fascinating reading, but it doesnʼt help us prepare the troops 
for the type of combat we will start to see in the next thirty years, 
in whatever form it appears.  Author Jeffrey Barnett says it best, 
“Information will dominate future war.  Wars will be won by the 
side that enjoys and can exploit:
- cheap information while making information expensive for 
its opponent
- accurate information within its own organization while pro-
viding or inserting inaccurate data in its opponent s̓ system
- near-real-time information while delaying its opponent s̓ 
information loop
- massive amounts of data while restricting data available to 
its opponent; and
- pertinent information while filtering out unnecessary 
data.”31
It does not matter who has the most toys, Barnett implies. 
“Tactical effectiveness … depends on the control systems over 
the war theater and efficiency in utilizing information from the 
theater.”32
Information operations is a skill that must be taught early and 
properly managed throughout a career, just as AFSPC has tried 
to turn around the management of space professional education. 
To that end, it could use a senior-level champion, as proposed in 
the Space Commission report, which stated that an Under Secre-
tary of Defense for Space, Intelligence and Information should 
be established to, among other things, “oversee the Department s̓ 
research and development, acquisition, launch and operation of 
its space, intelligence and information assets.”33  Unfortunately, 
in May of 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld reported that 
he had instead recommended that the staff “review the respon-
sibilities and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence…” to this 
end.34  This is the wrong focus; a cop-out.  This again comfortably 
equates information with technology and allows the management 
of information operations to be swallowed up by a technocrat.
A second recommendation is to revamp information opera-
tions doctrine.  As of December 2005, Joint Publication 3-13: In-
formation Operations, has not been updated in over seven years.35 
(This is still better than the twelve years it took for JP 3-14, Space 
Doctrine, to get published initially.)  We believe that this is woe-
fully inadequate.  AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, has been 
updated twice since 2002.  If the military is going to continue to 
use doctrine as a repository for officially sanctioned beliefs, war-
fighting principles, and terminology that describes and guides the 
proper use of air and space forces in military operations, it must 
remain current, fluid, and substantive.  It is appalling that Joint IO 
doctrine has been allowed to languish for nearly a decade.36
Third, the concept of Information Control should be adopted 
within IO doctrine.  This would emphasize the importance of capa-
bilities to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow 
of information while exploiting or denying an adversary s̓ ability 
to do the same.  In space doctrine, space control is the overall 
realm of responsibility in which space superiority is gained and 
maintained to assure friendly forces can use the space environ-
ment while denying its use to the enemy.  To accomplish this, 
space forces must survey space, protect the ability to use space, 
prevent adversaries from exploiting US or allied space services, 
and negate the ability of adversaries to exploit their space forces. 
In the 21st century, air and space superiority is unfortunately al-
most immediately assumed before the first shot is fired.  Imple-
menting the overall situation awareness of the IO battlespace, and 
comprehending the offensive and defensive requirements neces-
sary to sustain an “information control” mission would help so-
lidify information as the fifth realm of warfare.  
Finally, IO has become so important a concept in our military 
that we should start to train IO specialists, that is, create a separate 
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Air Force Specialty Code for information operations officers and 
enlisted troops, so that they can become IO experts.  Currently, we 
train experts in air operations and space operations, in weather, in 
intelligence, in public affairs, in communications.  We then assume 
that each of them knows enough about information operations that 
any one of them could fill a slot requiring IO experience.  Until 
we begin to groom a cadre of IO professionals, and start to build a 
twenty-year arsenal of individuals performing the IO mission day 
in and day out, we will be forced to re-invent the wheel at every 
level each time a new person rotates into an IO assignment.
Conclusion
There is nothing we do in space that is not information opera-
tions.36                              - Maj Gen Thomas Goslin, 2001
         
In 2003, the Director of Force Transformation, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, wrote that the DoD “will treat information 
operations, intelligence, and space assets not simply as enablers 
of current US forces but rather as core capabilities of future forc-
es.”37  Therefore, information operations doctrine, training, and 
career specialization must continue to evolve in the 21st century, 
while simultaneiously strengthening its integration with space op-
erations.  As commander of the Space Warfare Center, Maj Gen 
Goslin once said, “Today, more than anything, space provides in-
formation.  And information today is a show-stopper.”38 
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